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INTRODUCTION 
Upon taking off ice, the Reagan ~dministration proposed .substantial - 
reductions .in government funding for the social sciences and the arts. 
' 
The most spectacular and publicized of these were slated for-the National 
. . 
Science Foundation (NSF), where the FY1982 budget for economic,social, 
. . . . 
and behavioral research faced cuts of up to.75% from President Carter's 
. . 
FYI981 budget, and the Nat.ional.Endowments.for the Arts and the Humanities 
(NEA and NEH), for which 50% reductions were announced. These were accom- 
panied by less dramatic reductions in the social research budgets of the 
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, the Justice ~e~akt- 
. . 
ment, and the ~ational ~nstitute of Education and in appropriations for 
. . 
health manpower training, museum services, and college libraries. Cuts 
in federal funding for the arts and the social sciences, if not universal, 
[ll were certainly widespread. 
The arts and the social sciences, to be sure, were not the only victims 
of the budget ax, which fell also on research and development appropriations 
as a whole. r21 To the extent that they did bear the burden of dispropor- 
tionately sharp reductions in funding, however, the immediate reason seems 
clear enough: They were especially inviting targets, because neither appeared 
to have. a broad, powerful constituency. The Administration apparently 
looked forward-to at least one set of unopposed budget reductions. [31 
As it turned out, the Administration was wrong. Social scientists 
mobilized quite effectively through the Consortium of Social Science Asso- 
ciations and other organizations. By July, 1981, when the House of Repre- 
sentatives took up the issue of social science cuts, not only did a large 
majority of Congressmen favor restoring much'of. the slashed funds but also 
debate on the issue was marked by a respect for the social sciences rarely 
shown in the past. Noticeably absent were the often voiced claims that 
. the social sciences were trivial aid useless. Enough .pressure was also 
brought to bear by the supporters of the arts to restore about haif of, 
the proposed cuts at NEA and NEH. [41 
- 
The arts and social sciences, however, are not yet obt of the woods. 
- - 
The FY1983 budget calls for further cuts or for modest increases that fail 
. . - .  . . 
to keep pace with inflation. The Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor 
statistics are eliminating some basic surveys, and duaranteed student 
Loans and other kinds of training support may be threatened. [ 51 
More importantly, government funding for the arts and social sciences 
faces opposition that goes deeper than the matter of budget pruning. The 
Reagan Administration is an-alliance of two distinct- forces--a mainstream, 
corporate-oriented Republicanism and a revitalized independent conservative 
movement. Its budget cutting accordingly reflects two distinct impulses-- 
the standard Republican/corporate capitalist desire simply to curtail 
government spending and the conservative desire not only to cut spending 
in general but also to "defund the left" in particular by eliminating 
especially those programs it regards as the basic source of liberal and 
radical social change in the U.S. Government funding for the social'sciences 
and the arts is on this conservative hit list. 
Although the agenda of the conservative movement is not identical with 
that of the Reagan-Administration as a whole, conservatives nonetheless 
remain a potent force; and their priorities wiil continue to be heard, if 
not always followed. Administration opposition to government funding for 
the social sciences and the arts therefore will continue to arise from 
ideological as well as cost-cutting considerations. It will not be wholly 
sated by a balanced budget nor fully chastened by effective lobbying. 
To understand this deep.er ideological threat to government support 
. . 
for the social sciences and:the arts, let us look more closely at American 
3dnservatism. .Our discussion has three parts. .The first traces the 
history of contemporary American conservatism and identifies its central 
. . 
ideological themes.' The second argues that the belief that government and 
intellectuals are the two main sources of liberal social change has led 
. . .  
conservatives to target government programs allegedly guilty of social 
activism and to develop their own relatively autonomous "counterintel- 
. . 
lectd~l" network.. The third examines how this -political agenda and insti- - 
. . . .  
tutional structzure have influenced conservative opposition to government 
funding of the social sciences and-the arts. 
AMERICAN CONSERVATISM 
The term "conservative" hasgone through numerous and sometimes tortuous ., 
. . 
changes of meaning, sinc&it was first applied to 'the intellectual reaction 
. 
to the French and Industrial Revolutions in the early nineteenth century. 
In the United states, the term now refers to the movement that began as 
the delayed intellectual and political reaction to the New Deal in the 
early 1950s and found expression first in McCarthyism, later in the Goldwater 
. . 
movement, and most recently in -the New Right. Since the 1950s, this movement 
has sought to develop a "coordinated, self-consciously conservative intel- . - 
lectual force" in American life and in the proce&s has given "conser~atisrn~~ 
a new and distinctive meaning. [GI  
. . 
  he cornerstone. of this emerging, conservatism in the 1950s was the 
. . 
conviction that the United States and Western civilization were threatened . 
by a growing tide of what was termed "statism," llcollectivism," or "ratio- 
nalism"--the trend toward centralization of in the state and the use ' 
. . 
. . 
. . . 9 .  . 
of that power t o  reorganize and ,plan social life in a systematic, self- . : , . _ . _ I !  .: 
. - *  
. . 
conscious way. In the conservative view, fascism,' communism, social demo- . . 
. 
. > 
cracy, .and the New Deal were merely different versions of this same trend-- 
[71 some more-benign than others. 
Contemporary conservatism developed from this core belief as a syn- 
thesis of three ideological tendencies: a libertarianism. eager to reassert 
the values of individualism, freedom, and the market against the encroach- 
- 
ments of government and the trend toward "collectivism"; a traditionalism 
struggling to reestablish the importance of religion, shared values, and 
. . 
social constraints. in the face of what it perceived as a secular, .atomized, 
. . 
mass society; and finally, .a militant anti-communism convinced that the West . 
. . 
. . 
. . . L 
. .  . . . 
. . 
- .  . . . - . - . . 
.was locked in a life-or-death struggle with an implacable Communist .adver- 
sary with "horn no co-existence or compromise was possible. Each spoke a 
. . . . 
. . distinctive language: .  he'. .libertarian emphasis on freedom and individualism 
. .  . 
differed dramatically : irom the traditionalist emphasis on constraint and 
. . 
. . 
community, while both differed from the anti-communist stress on imperatively: 
Z +. . . 
. . . . . .. . 
. [81 coordinated mobiliz'ation against a mortal foe. 
. . 
3 .  .. . 
.The' synthesis accordingly has often been uneasy, and differences between 
. . 
the three tendencies have often erupted in acrimo6ioks debate-. in the pages 
. .  . . . .  
of conservative journals. Some libertarians have regarded the traditions-list 
. . 
emphasis on restraint and its suspicion of individualism as one more kind 
of. collectivism; others have mistrusted the militarist mentality of anti- 
. . . - 
communism. Traditionalists for their -part have sometimes viewed liber- 
tarianism as one more example of corrosive materialist, secular thought. 
Discussion of the relationship between.libertarianism and traditionalism 
. .  . .  
, 191 continues even today. 
. . 
Despite the continuing ideological contention, the conservative move- 
ment-in the 1950s and 1960s increasingly succeeded in binding sympathetic 
individuals into a common set of organizations and formal networks. 
Coriservatives -developed or adopted:.comrnon. forums for ideas (National ::-- 
Review, Human Events, Modern Age), political action.groups (the American 
conservative union);' and organizations to educate a new generation (the 
- .  . . 
Intercollegiate Studies Institute, the. Young ~mericans for Freedom). . 
~ Although they.did not reach an intellectual consensus, they at least de- 
~. 
veloped a commdn focus of disagreement and debate and a recognition that 
they shared common enemies. More important.ly, the conservative movement 
developed relatively clear boundaries'separating those who belonged from 
those who did not. The precise intellectual justification may not have 
always been clear. or unanimously accepted,' but libertarians who .we.re too . 
militantly secular (e. g . , ' Ayn Rand) ' of, anti-militarist (e .g . , those who 
opposkd American involv&ent. in Vietnam and left the Youhg Americans for 
. . 
. . 
Freedom to fqrm the ~ibertarian Party) and traditionalists who found the 
. . 
. . .  . . 
New De+l quite consistent with conservative principles .(e.g., -peter Viereck) - 
. . -  
found themselves unambiguously beyond the pale. 
. . . . 
. In the last decade, the conservative movement has expanded rapidly, 
. . .. . . 
feeding upon the political reaction to the progressive movementsT of the late 
. . 
. ... . . .  . 
1960s and early 1970s. ' It has developed a .broader, more .effective network 
of political organizations (known as the "New Right"), which comprises such 
. . 
as the National Conservative political Action ~ommittee, the Con- 
- .  
servative Caucus, the Committee for the ~urvivk-l of. a ~ i e e  Congress, : .  
Coalitions for America, the Moral Majority, and Stop ERA. [lo' With the 
help of corporate funding and neo-conservative allies, it has also fostered 
. . .  
a growing intellectual .network of research institutions, about which we. 
shall say more shortly. 
. . 
Conservatives today self -consc'iously focus on three sets of issues : 
. . .  . . . .  . .  . . . 
first, support of a market economy against government intervkntion and 
regulation; second, a defense of morality, family, and religion against 
perceived processes of moral decay; secularization, -and cultural .revolution ; 
. . 
and .third, a call for a stronger, more aggressive international -campaign 
against the Soviet Union and communism in general.: This combination of 
. . 
. . . - 
issues defines contemporary American. conservatisr?_ (in the eyes of its pro- 
ponents as. well as opponents) and just as clearly demarcates it from what 
it is not: American conservatism is not a simple anti-modern conservatism 
of the kind found in nineteenth-century Europe and in a weaker form in the . 
U.S. among groups like the southern Agrarians : ~ndeed, it enthusiastically 
. . 
embraces many of the central features of modern society--industrialism, 
. . .  
capitalism,'advancing 'techno.logy, and economic growth. Nor is it a pure 
. . . . . .  
libertarianism like. that of the contemporary Libertarian Party: Its . . 
enthusiasm for individual freedom does 'nit extend beyond the marketplace. 
. . . . 
Still less is i<t simpiy a -big .business ideology- concerned exclusively kith 
. . 
. .  . . . .  
' . economic issues: ~onservatives often find business too nonc&mittal o n  
both social and national security matters. 1111 
FIGHTING THE LEFT 
The conservative opposition to government funding of the social sciences 
and the arts arises from the deep-seated.conviction that the major source 
. . 
of liberal (and radical) social change is and intellectual elites. 
. . .  From this perspective; the expanded rile of government in economic life, 
. . 
the dec1in.e of the nuclear family,and the growing permissiveness on moral 
. . 
issues reflect neither the inherent.strains of American social structure- 
. .  . 
nor real .aspirations of most ~rnericans. They are simply the result of . . 
. liberal activists in government and. liberal intellectuals in the universities 
and mass media. Except for their influence, the market,. the family, religion, . . 
and other soc'ial institutions that conservatives cherish would constitute 
a naturally harmonious, self-maintaining order. Take away the liberals' . 
ability to use-government 'funds to promote social change and dounter .their 
dominance of intellectual life, and liberalfsm and the Left would collapse. 
"Defunding the Left" and building a counterintellectual network thus are 
important for conservatives. 
, ' -. 
. . Defunding the Left 
- - '  
, . 
Liberal and leit-wing causes, coniervatives maintain, are largely 
. - 
government subsidized. .According to Richard vig;erie, the major Ney Right 
. . .  
fundraiser and publisher of Conservative Digest, 
. . 
-. 
For more than a decade, the Left has relied on 
government subsidies to finance its activities. .. 
My estimate is that 70 percent of the Left's 
financing comes from the government. While 
liberals loudly claim to represent the people, 
they are primarily financed by compulsory tax 
dollars. 1121 
. .  . . . . . . . .  
Or in the words .or Howard Phillips, director of the Conservative Caucus, 
In the name of fighting poverty and overcoming 
inequality, tens of billions of dollars have 
been assigned, since the early 1960s, to,support 
hundreds of thousands of full-time activists 
employed by tens of thousands of 'non-profit 
corporations' promoting virtually every 'liberal' 
cause of the past two decades from abortion on 
demand, to forced busing, to quotas, to 'welfare 
rights'. Opponents of U.S. defense policies, 
militant homosexuals, radical feminists, supporters 
of the Ayatollah Khomeini, organizers of rent 
strikes and prisoners' unions, foes of capital 
punishment and many more of the same ilk have 
been subsidized by hard-working taxpayers to 
[I31 promote their narrow, nihilistic political goals. 
A major source of these subsidies, according to conservatives, is the 
. ~ 
Legal Services Corporation (LSC). Conservatives picture the LSC as a 
. . 
"$300 million subsidy for liberal causes" [ I  and regard it as a home for 
. . 
all manner of political undesirables. -- 
. . ... there'is no question that-the Corporation is,in the hands of 
radicals, eager to bring about a major social upheaval .in American 
society. Legal Services attorneys have been involved in mobilizing 
. 
rent strikes, promoting abortions, fostering - unions, and backing . 
prison 'rights. ' [151. 
The Legal Services Corp. is infested with liberals, radicals, and 
Marxists. who want to reshape ~merican society. [I6] 
~amily planning and research fund's provided under Title X of 
the ~ub1ic'~ealth:~ervices Act appear as equally subversive: By underwriting 
. . . . .  . . -  
"contraception, abortion referrals, antilife research; and immoral sex 
. . . . . . ... 
education" and .supporting radical groups like Planned Parenthood, government 
. . .  , . . . . . 
has +evolution: in . values and behavior.: [I7] : A  yariety 
. . . .  
. . .  . . . . .  . . 
of other goveryent -. . programs, -.including the com&uiity serviced Agency and . . 
the National Endowment for the Humanities (about which we shall have more 
. - .  . , - . .  . . .  . . . -  . . . .  . . .'.. - . - .AS - . . 
to. say) , ,stand indicted ,'. -in similar terms. .... . - . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . % .  . . .  ? .  . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . * , . -  .  ..I. ... . . 
. . .  
. . . . . .  . . , .  . ... -. - .  . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . :  . . . .  . . .  . . - ? .. .. - . - 
In short, the argument is that while conservatives go to th.e2people 
. . 
for funding, liberals ,run to the government. "Defunding the Left" by . 
. . 
ending its government subsidies is thus at the heart of the conservgtive 
agenda. Conservatives have lobbied vigorously againit the LSC and other 
. . 
. . .  . . .  
offending .programs and have supported block grants as a- way of permanently 
. . 
getting money out of the hands of the liberal activists in the federal 
1181 government. 
. . 
Last June, despite misgivings about Reagan's personnel appointments 
and his commitment to the social issues, Viguerie pronounced himself "pleased 
. . .  
and in many respects pleasantly surprised" by the President's performance . , 
because 
at least 70 percent of. just about every conservative's agenda 
is being handled beautifully by President Reagan, Stockman, 
and other5 in the administration. Tha.t 70 percent is what . . 
conservatives call "de-funding the Left. " [191 
~uildin~ 5 Counterintellectual Network 
The notion that intellectuals and the institutions they inhabit have 
been a major source of political protest and social change has been popular 
among conservatives of all kinds ever since Edmund Burke. Conservatives 
have cultivated what may be called a "counterintellectual" tradition.. 
. . . .  . 
Since the French Revolution, the intellectuals have never ceased 
to.be shadowed by-the counterintellectuals--the party of public 
. . thinkers that opposes the typical adversary. role the intellectuals 
play in public life. 120] 
. . 
The counterintellectual has perennially charged the intellectual with 
. . 
. . 
elitism, radicalism, illegitimate power, remoteness from the .practical 
. - . .. - 
world,. and. an antagonistic, even treasonous stance to society. .' . . . . .:.. - .  
. I .  
. . .  . . 
.:.: Since its.'hirth in the 1950s, contemporary. ~rnerican .~onservatism:has embraced 
this "counterintellectudl" stance, accusing universities and the media qi 
a leftward bias and blaming intellectuals for undermining established 
American institutions and beliefs. The seminal work of this conservatism, . 
after all, was William F. Buckley, jr.'s God and Man at Yale, which indicted 
the author's alma mater for-being a'hotbed of socialism and secularism. 
. . 
similar claims about intellectuals and cultural institutions in general, 
. . 
have resounded through conservative writing ever since. In recent years, 
. , . 
for example, conservatives .have co&only argued that intellectuals are the 
vanguard of an entire "new class" of college-educated professionals working 
in the information-processing, governmental, and non-profit sectors of the 
economy. This "new class" is the culprit behind all manner of radical 
movements aimed at redistributing income, limiting economic growth, weakening 
American power in the world, and revolutionizing morals. ~ h r o u ~ h  
.. . . . 
the media, and the universities, it has propagated an anti-capitalist, 
. . 
anti-materialist, anti-Puritanical "adversary -dultureSS and has $ven chaylenged 
t 211 the hegemony of the capitalist class. -- 
. . 
The conservative cdunterintellectuals in America have thus consistently . 
distanced themselves from the liberal intellectuals, and the' latter have 
. .  . 
usually returned the compliment: In the 1950s and'early 1960s, conser- 
vatives were either read out of the American tradition or dismissAd a& 
_ -  . 
. . 11 
. . . . . . 
a lunatic fringe in works like Louis Hartz's The Libera1,Tradition in America. 
. . .  
and ~ a n i e ~ '  Bell's The Radical Right. 
1n reaction to the radicalism df the late 1960s and early 1970.~~ many 
who once dismissed conservatism -now make common cause with it (a 
sometimes called "neo-conservatism" ) . Although the lilie of. -demarcation 
. . . . . . 
has thus shifted, it still exists: ~pnservati$es, whoever they may be . . . 
. . 
at any given time, 'constitute a counterintelligentia; standing in alien- 
ation from what they regard as the mainstream intellectual world. 
 he antagonistic stance of conservatLve counterinteile.ctu~ls has 
. . .  
. . 
led them td build a.relatively autonomous intellectual network of research 
. institutions. This network, which grew 'slowly through the 1950s and.1960~~ 
. .  
has -expanded rapidly in .the past decade thanks to an -in£ usion of corporate 
money and neo-conservative support. . . 
corporate capitalism- has recently launched a major ideological offensive 
to praise the free market and discredit government regulation and the 
welfare state. This..new corporate activism has underwritten public television 
shows, . chairs of free, enterprise at -universities, advocacy advertising, 
. . 
books, 'and educational films, but above all it has subsidized the vast 
. -  
[221 
, expansion. of conservati+e research institutions. 
. . 
In the forefront of this, id&oiogical assault have been a number of 
especially active corporate foundations and trusts that have focused'their 
- 
contributions on research institutes and individuals developing free-market 
and other conservative ideas. The John M. Olin, Smith Richardson, Adolph 
Coors , Samuel Roberts Noble, Bechtel , Hearst, and Lilly ~oundations ;
the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust; and the various Scaife family foundations 
and trusts together-funnel over $25 million a year into the development of 
[231 conservative ideology. 
. . 
The. Scaife family trusts', based -in Gulf Oil, Alcoa, 'and Mellqn ~ank' 
. . . . 
money, are the .largest of these cdnservative donors and their contributions 
are fairly representative.. Under the- aegis of Richard Mellon Scaife, they 
increased their donations to conservative causes during the 1970s to 
$10 million a year. Since 1970, the Scaifes have given over $5 million 
each to the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . -  . the Georgetown .University Center- for strategic and ~nternational Studies, 
. 
and the National Strategy Information Center, as well as $4.1 million to 
the Hoover Institution, $2.6 million to the Heritage Foundation, and smaller 
[243 amounts to numerous similar institutions. 
This corporate largesse has been elicited and organized in part by 
neo-conservative intellectuals (especially those clustered around The Public 
. - . . 
~nteTest and Commentary) in an effort to fight against the "new class" and 
. . 
.its "adversary culture. " [251 irving Kristol, for example, who is editor of 
The Public Interest, a contributing editor to the Wall Sfreet Journal, and 
an AEI fellow, has used the specter of the "new class" to convince cor- 
porate capitalists to invest more heavily in the creation and dissemination 
of conservative ideology. He has sought to coordinate business support 
for conservative intellectual work by co-founding (with William Simon) 
the Institute for Educational Affairs (IEA) in 1978. Initially funded 
by Olin, Smith Richardson, and Scaife money, IEA has attempted to act as 
. . 
a clearinghouse for channelling corporate money into suitably conservative.. 
intellectual projects. In 1980, it had some 74 corporate and gave 
. . 
45 grants totalling over half a million dollars. .I261 
As a result of this combination'of new corporate activism and in- 
tellectual neo-conservatism, the network of conservative think tanks has 
expanded considerably. The annual budget of AEI, the largest of the con- 
servative research institutes, increased tenfold in the 1970s to $10.5 million, 
. and Kristol is credited with gaining much of AEI's new corporate. support. 
Stanford University' s Hoover Institution, oh the verge. of bankruptcy in. 
. . the early 1960s; now has .an annual. budget of $5.7 million, while Georgetown's 
. . 
Center for strategic. and .International studies now spends $4.5 million 
. . 
a year. -. Joinilig.these venerable think tanks are a host of new ones, the 
. . 
. .. most fkous-of which is .probably the ~erita~e Foundation. ~ e ~ u ~  in 1973 
. . 
.. . . . 
,. with several hundred- -thousand dollars from industrialist Joseph' Coors, 
Heritage now has an annual budget of $5.3 million. Its biggest contributors 
include Scaife and Coors, as well as Noble, Olin, and 87 major corporations. 
The growing list of other conservative think tanks and information centers 
. . . . 
includes' Center ' for Law and Economics, Center for Public Choice, Institute 
for Contemporary ~tudies,'International Institute for Economic Research, 
. . 
Center for Free ~ntek~rise, center fdr Research in ~overnment policy and 
Business, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Centerfor 'the Study of American 
Business, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, National Strategy Infor- 
1271 mation Center, and the Lehrman ~nstitute. 
  his growing conservative counterintellectual network has .not only 
provided a steady stream of conservative . ideas . and ~ea~anadvisers but also 
reinforced the conservative sense of independence from the "liberal" in- 
tellectual world a'nd -its sources of funding. This sense may . not . be wholly 
accurate--conservatives 'also rely directly and indirectly on governmental 
- 
largesse--but it has helped.to condition. the attitudes of some conservatives 
toward government funding of the social sciences in particular. 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND'THE ARTS 
Ostensibly, the conservative case against government funding for the 
social sciences is simply that most social science research is trivial and 
' , . a waste o f  money; This argument, which .has been repeated by conservatives . . 
in Congress f~r~years, found especially clear expression about a year 
ago in an article by Donald Lambro in Human Events. r281 Lambro ridiculed 
the usefulness and importance of a number of NSF-funded social science 
projects based on their titles and official project abstracts: studies 
of food tastes in rats, dating behavior of teenagers, and speech patterns 
in Philadelphia. 
There is more here than immediately meets the eye, however, The con- 
servative case against the social sciences rests on a methodological 
double standard. Conservatives admit that it would be foolish to dismiss 
research in the natural sciences on the basis of a cursory reading of 
titles and abstracts. Apparently arcane research on the growth of viruses 
in the kidney cells of monkeys, after all, can ultimately lead to eminently 
useful things like polio vaccine. Yet they see no problem in pronouncing 
I summary judgment on the social sciences on that very same basis. 
This double standard suggests that an inherent, tacit bias against 
the social sciences lurks in,the conservative'mind. ;It seems plausible 
that this bias.is rooted in the counterintellectualism~that we have already 
mentioned. The social sciences appear to be subversive of conservative 
values in a way that the natural sciences are not; . . 
. This is partly because conservatives see the social~sciknces as deeply 
tainted with liberalism. Among all intellectuals and academics, social 
> .  
scientists appear as the.most liberal in their political attitudes, while 
.the social sciences themselves seem to be used consistently on a day-to-day 
level to justify liberal programs and policies.' There is something 'more 
. . 
. . '. f undament'al , -however :- Beyond whatever - speci.fiic policies it- justifies , con- . 
. . 
. . . . 
servitives believe khe application of science to society intrinsically leads . 
. . . . 
to. the celitralized planning.and rationalization- of social life. ' Social science, 
. . 
. .. . . . . . . 
in other wbrds, equals social engineering, which leads ko the - very statism that 
lies at the dark heart of conservative' nightmares. 
. . 
This view of social science is manifest in the supply-side economics 
. . 
currently popular among conservatives, This theory is the quintessential 
3 
. product of the conservative counterintellectual network, bringing together 
corporate money, conservative think tanks, and neo-conservative steward- 
ship. Alerted to supply-side ideas by Irving Kristol, the Smith Richardson 
Foundation subsidized their development through grants to think tanks 
li.ke the American Enterprise Institute and the International Center for 
.- . . 
Economic Policy, individuals like George Gilder and Jude Wanniski, and 
. [291 journals' like The Pub'lic Interest. Not surprisingly, supply-side 
economics has taken a counterintellectual stance to mainstream economic 
theory. It rejects "academic" economics for being scientistic: for treating 
the economy as an impersonal system rather than as an ensemble of individual 
actions and motivations; for dealing only with quantifiable factors that 
can be fit into complex models, while ignoring the qualitatively human; 
and for theories that are inherently. managerial in style. In 
I 
short, mainstream economics appears to supply-siders as necessarily leading 
to social engineering of some kind. 1301 . . - 
Although not all conservatives embrace supply-side economics, it cer- 
tainly has ignited the imagination of many, and it does accurately embody 
. . 
a broader.conservative attitude toward the social sciences.. . This attitude, 
reinforced by the seeming autonomy of the counterintellectual network; power- 
fully predisposes conservatives against government. funding for the social 
sciences. 
. . 
The conservative case against government funding for the arts is con- . 
. - 
... . . . . 
. . siderably more .complex than the case against the social'sciences. Two. very 
different, even contradictory, conservative arguments (which we shall call 
., . . 
the "libertarian" and- the "traditionalist") manage to co-exist with hardly ' ' 
any sense of paradox or .conflict. Both oppose the current way that govern- 
. . . 
ment supports the arts, but for very.'different..reasons. . . 
. . 
The libertarian argues that government funding of 'the arts is inherently 
- ,  . . 
wrong and necessarily counterproductive. Art is not a transcendent good 
that everyone should be forced to support. It is a matter of taste, and 
. - ?, 
different persons have different artistic preferences, Government has no 
right to use taxpayers' money to subsidize the'artistic preferences of 
some. As Ernest van den Haag put it in a Policy Review article: 
It is not the task of a democratic government to decide for 
the people what is essential to them and to buy it for them 
with money taken from them--when people could, if they so 
desired, purchase for themselves what the government provides. 1311 
Government funding, moreover, ruins art. The infusion of funds attracts 
I 
the less talented and less committed, inflates costs, and encourages mindless 
experimentation. It gives control over art to bureaucrats and experts. 
From the libertarian' perspective, as expressed by Tom Bethel, "the principle 
instrument for eliciting creativity in people of artistic disposition is 
the marketplace itself. ,, [321 Having to please a paying audience forces 
the 'artist to do his best; the cushion of a guaranteed -subsidy . 
. . 
encourages bad work. In short, for the libertarian, art .is and ought to . . 
be a commodity like everything else; .all government support should be ended. 
. . 
The traditionalist , in contrast, ' believes that government funding ior 
the arts is both good and necessary, but not in the current form or at the 
. .  
current levels. As Michael Joyce'argued in the Heritage Foundation's report 
. . 
. [331 
to President Reagan, art is not simply a matter of taste; it involves 
the pursuit of a.definable excellence. Government has the duty to promote 
Y . . 
" 
that pursuit of excellence and defend it against the egalitarian, levelling 
. . 
. impulses of American 'so=i&ty. ~eaving art to popuiar preference on the 
market or &the&ise means opening it to debasement. ~stadlished funding 
policies in NEH and NEA, however, are misguided and counterproductive: 
Rather than protecting art from the debasing effect of popularization, 
the Endowments have sought to bring art to a wider audience by under- 
writing the expansion of cultural facilities and subsidizing admission 
costs. In addition, they have encouraged the politicization of art and - 
have sought to enact quotas for recipients of grants. Once these spurious 
activities are eliminated, government's proper role can be fulfilled at 
a much lower .level of funding. 
. . 
One can hardly imagine two more different attitudes toward art. 
The one argues that there really is no such thing as art, but only artistic 
preferences; the other .insists on the reality of artistic excellence. 
'The one argues that.art thrives'as a commodity; the other fears the impact 
bf'the market on art. The one believes that government has a role ic 
promoting the arts; the other believes it has an essential (albeit reduced) 
role. 
Despite the .- disparity, the two arguments co-exist with little friction. 
They are not the province of different kinds of conservatives writing in 
different-places. To the contrary, both cases have been made in the 
publications of the Heritage Foundation. Indeed, one can sometimes find 
them together in the very.same article without the author apparently sensing 
the least inconsistency. In a 1980 article in Policy Review, for example, 
Kingsley Amis indiscriminately mixes traditionalist and libertarian arguments 
'. [343.1 . . 
against government subsidy of the arts. At. one point he .argues that 
government subsidies endanger art by ~opularizing it:  he trouble with . . 
. . 
bringing art to the people is that ittends to get fatally damagedin 
. . 
. tran~it.~' At another point; he argues that government subsidies endanger . . . 
art by taking it away from the public: "The public's whim is better than 
. . 
the critics1 whim or the experts' whim or the buieaucratsl whim.,". No 
doubt these two cases could be reconciled: Perhaps the "peoplew in the 
I 
first quote are not quite the same as the "public" in the second. The 
point; however, is that the need for reconciliation goes unrecognized. 
., 1 - 
- . r _  , 
The libertarian and traditionalist cases against government fuliding 
for the arts are held together the way libertarian and traditionalist 
strands of conservativism have always been held together: The sense of 
a common enemy overrides philosophical differences . Both positions agree 
that existing government funding for the arts has encouraged radical cultural 
and political trends. Conservatives have widely condemned the National 
Endowments for the Humanities for "bankrolling" a "Leftist Democratic ' '  
~etwork" by supporting educational and cultural projects of the International 
Ladies Garment Workers Union, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers 
. Union, the AFL-CIO Labor Studies Center;District 1199 of the Drug and . . . . 
Hospital Employees union. World Without War Council. The sierra club, the 
. . 
1353 reminist Radio Network. and various gay periodicals. . . . . . . 
- .  
For conservatives, this is a clear case of government subsidy to liberal- .  i . .  
left movements and to an adversary culture. It is accordingly the very core 
of what they object to in government funding for the arts. whatever the . . 
varying philosophical contexts in which they place it. 
opposition to government 'funding of the arts and the social sciences is 
rooted deeply in American conservatism.' It reflects conservatism's-counter- 
intellectual tradition and its broader priority of "defunding the Left." 
These deeper determinants of the conservative position on government funding 
. . . . . . 
are.not always explicit, but they help make sense of otherwise inexplicable . 
. . 
surface contradictions in cdnservitive -arguments. 
How much this conservative stance will shape the political agenda of 
the Reagan Admin'istration remains to be ' seen.. - As we have noted,. the Reagan 
Administration is an uneasy coalition of corporate capitalists and conser- 
vative ideologues. Although they often work together, their goals are 
fundamentally different. The former seek practical adjustments in govern- 
ment spending and regulation to enhance the &mediate and real prospects 
. . . . 
for capital acciunulation; they would rather trade with than confront the 
. . . . 
Soviet Union; they generally avoid social issues like abortion. The latter. . 
seek to remake society more broadly in the image of "free enterprise"; 
they demand a more aggressively anti-communist foreign policy; they give 
high priority to the social issues. The Reagan Administration so far has 
kept this alliance together by acting like the former, while talking like 
. . 
, . the latter. AS the ~dministration continues to confront difficult economic 
and foreign. policy issues, however, its ruling coalition. .is bound. to become 
- . . 
increasingly 'rent by conflict. .The outcome of this conflict--which side 
of the coalition triumphs and .what .concessionis the losers receive--may well 
determine the fate of government funding of the social sciences and the arts. 
. .-*.-.- - . -.-. - - -- -. . . .- .- --- . - - - - . . . .-- - -.. . .. . - .-r . . . . .CY . - - . .' . -- . - - . . . .- 
. . . . -  . . 
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